Religious institutions occupy a central position in the structure of Arab societies, where their role is not limited to the devotional field, but extends to multiple social, political and cultural fields, especially in light of the weakness of the modern state and its declining ability to manage structural crises.
In religiously pluralistic societies, such as Lebanon, the roles of these institutions as representative authorities and intermediaries between groups and the state become increasingly important.
The Supreme Islamic Shiite Council is one of the most prominent examples of this role, since its establishment in 1969, in a historical context characterized by the social and political marginalization of the Shiite community.
The religious institution is defined as a formal or semi-formal organizational structure concerned with organizing religious affairs. However, in Arab societies, it performs additional functions resulting from the overlap of religion with politics and society (Abdullah Al-Aroui, The Concept of the State). Al-Aroui believes that the weakness of the formation of the modern state has opened the way for traditional actors, foremost among them religious institutions, to fill the functional void (same source).
The functions of religious institutions can be summarized in four basic functions:
The value-based function: to establish public morals and regulate social behavior.
Social function: care, solidarity, education, and services.
Indirect political function: representing the group and defending its interests.
The crisis function: to contain and mitigate conflicts (Mohammed Abed Al-Jabri, Religion, State and the Application of Sharia).
However, these functions become problematic when the institution loses its independence, or when religion becomes a tool for justifying power instead of being a tool for moral critique.
Until the 1960s, the Shia community in Lebanon suffered from political marginalization and weak institutional representation within the structure of the Lebanese sectarian system, despite its demographic and social weight. Its official presence was limited to a few political positions, in addition to the Jaafari judiciary specializing in personal status matters, without a central authority to represent it, unlike the Dar al-Fatwa for Sunni Muslims or the religious councils of other sects (Ahmad Baydoun, The Sect, Sectarianism, Imagined Sects). This institutional absence resulted in clear developmental deprivation, especially in the southern and Bekaa regions, where economic neglect combined with weak social services, deepening the sense of injustice within the community.
Since the 1950s, Lebanon has witnessed rapid social and economic transformations, represented by the large rural migration to the cities, the emergence of poor neighborhoods on the outskirts of Beirut, and the rise of political and social awareness among marginalized groups.
These transformations were accompanied by the influence of Arab nationalist and reformist movements, which prompted segments of the Shiite religious elite to rethink the role of the religious institution and its relationship with the state and society (Fawaz Traboulsi, Modern History of Lebanon).
Imam Musa al-Sadr emerged as the central figure in shaping the project to establish the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council. Since his arrival in Lebanon in 1959, he called for organizing the affairs of the sect within a legal institutional framework, considering that the absence of an official authority weakens the position of the Shiites within the state and prevents their effective participation in national life (Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, Imam al-Sadr and the Path of Deprivation).
Al-Sadr linked the religious and social dimensions, emphasizing that religion is inseparable from issues of justice, development, and alleviating deprivation, and that the envisioned council should be an instrument of reform, not a tool for sectarian isolation. These efforts culminated in the law issued on December 19, 1969, which established the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council as an official institution recognized by the Lebanese state, tasked with managing the religious and social affairs of the Shiite community and representing it before the authorities (Hani Fahs, Imam Musa al-Sadr: Dialogue and Openness).
In 1970, Imam Musa al-Sadr was elected as the first president of the council, which gave the new institution religious and popular legitimacy and consolidated its role in Lebanese public life (Wajih Kawtharani, State and Society in the Arab East).
The establishment of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council reflects a structural shift in the position of the Shiite community, as it represented a transition from marginalization to institutional action, an expression of the development of Shiite religious thought towards engagement in public affairs, and an attempt to reconcile sectarian affiliation with commitment to Lebanese national unity (Radwan al-Sayyid, Islamic Groups and the State).
The council played a broad social role, which included supervising religious endowments and institutions, supporting religious schools and institutes, and sponsoring charitable societies and social services. Political science professor Hilal Khashan affirms that “this role contributed to strengthening social solidarity and reducing the effects of poverty and deprivation in marginalized Shiite areas.” However, it remained linked to the council’s ability to secure resources and to the political transformations that affected its independence.
Since its establishment, the role of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council has not been limited to religious and social affairs, but has undertaken a national political role stemming from its status as an official institution representing a broad segment of Lebanese citizens. This role was launched from a vision that considers participation in public affairs a right and a duty, and that defending social justice is an integral part of the religious message (Musa al-Sadr, Speeches and Positions). The Council also formed an institutional link between the Shiite community and the Lebanese state, as it represented the community in dialogue with official authorities, conveyed the demands of deprived areas to decision-making circles, and contributed to integrating the Shiites into the national equation instead of keeping them on its margins (Fawaz Traboulsi, Modern History of Lebanon). Imam Musa al-Sadr emphasized that this role does not aim to reinforce sectarian isolation, but rather to achieve balanced participation within the single state (Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, Imam al-Sadr and the Path of Deprivation).
The Council’s discourse, especially in its founding phase, was characterized by an emphasis on the unity of the Lebanese entity, a rejection of division and isolation, and the consolidation of the principle of Muslim-Christian coexistence. Imam al-Sadr expressed on many occasions the Council’s commitment to defending Lebanon as the final homeland for all its sons, considering that sects are not abolished, but rather organized within the framework of the state (Hani Fahs, Imam Musa al-Sadr: Dialogue and Openness).
With the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), the national role of the Council declined in favor of the rise of partisan and sectarian forces, which limited its effectiveness as a unifying institution. Wajih Kawtharani points out in his book “Society and State in Lebanon” that political sectarianism reproduced religious institutions as tools in the political conflict.
During the civil war, the council tried to play the role of mediator and social regulator, but political division and weak capabilities limited its influence, and it also faced major challenges during the periods of Israeli occupation of the south.
In light of the economic collapse that Lebanon is witnessing, the limited role of the council in providing structural solutions has become apparent, and its presence has often been limited to preaching and occasional social assistance (Ahmed Beydoun, Sects in the Post-Taif State).
Therefore, the experience of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council reveals several problems, most notably: the politicization of religion and the institution’s entanglement in power struggles, the decline of its critical role in favor of a justificatory one, sectarianism and weak national openness, and a decline in public trust in the religious establishment. In this context, Radwan al-Sayyid argues in his book “Community and Society in Lebanon” that the crisis of religious institutions lies in their loss of their critical moral function in the public sphere.
Today, the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council faces a crisis in defining its role and function within the Lebanese political and religious landscape. After having formed, upon its establishment, a comprehensive and effective framework, its presence has gradually declined in favor of partisan political forces that have gained greater influence over the popular base, which has led to a reduction in its representative role, and its transformation, in the eyes of many, into an administrative institution rather than a leading authority (Ahmad Baydoun, The Sect, Sectarianism, Imagined Sects).
This crisis is due to the changing nature of political work in Lebanon, the rise of armed or organized party actors, and the absence of a clear strategic vision for renewing the council’s function.
One of the most prominent problems the council suffers from is the erosion of its relative independence from political alignments. Instead of remaining a unifying authority at an equal distance from all forces, it is sometimes seen as part of the existing political balances, which has weakened its national and religious credibility among broad segments of the Lebanese population (Radwan al-Sayyid, Islamic Groups and the State).
This reality has led to a decline in his ability to play the role of mediator, a weakening of his critical discourse towards authority, and a diminishing of his role as a moral conscience in public life. This means that he is suffering from a structural crisis in the mechanisms of leadership and decision-making, manifested in institutional stagnation, weak rotation of responsibilities, and the absence of transparency and internal accountability.
In addition, the laws regulating its work have not been updated to keep pace with the social and cultural transformations that Lebanese society has witnessed, which has made its organizational structure closer to the traditional model that is unable to accommodate the requirements of the times.
Moreover, the council is also witnessing a growing gap between it and the younger generations, who no longer see it as a framework that expresses their aspirations or daily issues, especially in light of intellectual and cultural transformations, the rise of demands for social justice, and the spread of civil and critical discourse. The absence of a renewal discourse and the weak use of modern communication tools have contributed to deepening this disconnect, which has caused the council to lose some of its social vitality.
At the national level, the Council’s presence as a unifying voice calling for dialogue and coexistence has declined, compared to the foundational stage led by Imam Musa al-Sadr. This is attributed to the intensification of sectarian divisions, the decline of the central state, and the difficulty of producing a unifying national discourse in light of the sharp polarization.
To address these crises, the following reform paths must be emphasized:
First: Redefining the role by developing a clear vision that affirms that the council is an independent religious and national authority, and not an alternative to or subordinate to political forces, by protecting its decisions from alignments, restoring its position as a critical moral body that defends justice and citizens’ rights, as well as by updating internal laws, activating transparency mechanisms, and expanding participation within its various bodies.
Second: Moving from a traditional preaching discourse to a socio-ethical discourse that addresses issues of poverty, corruption, citizenship and the state, through the involvement of young talents, the adoption of modern communication tools and opening channels of dialogue with civil initiatives.
Third: Reviving the legacy of Imam Musa al-Sadr based on dialogue, rejection of violence, and defense of the state as the framework that regulates pluralism (Hani Fahs, Imam Musa al-Sadr: Dialogue and Openness). The crisis of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council is not isolated from the crisis of the Lebanese system as a whole. However, its particularity as an official religious institution gives it an opportunity to play a leading reformist role, if it has the courage for self-criticism and institutional renewal. It will either regain its position as a religious and national conscience, or it will continue to decline as a symbolic institution with limited influence (Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, The Commandments).
Thus, we conclude that the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council, at certain stages, represented a social and political lever for the Shiite community, but it faced structural challenges that limited its ability to play a comprehensive national role in crisis management. The ability of the religious institution to contribute to the solution depends on its independence and the extent of its commitment to its critical moral function in serving society and the state.