The Shia community in Lebanon has paid a heavy price for its exclusion from the state. The Shia duo, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, have insisted on ruling the community with an iron fist, erecting a barrier between it and official institutions, ensuring that the individual Shia’s relationship with the state is channeled solely through them. The devastating war of 2014 brought the issue of reforming this relationship to the forefront as a pressing necessity to extricate the Shia, and Lebanon with them, from the predicament into which they were plunged by their monopolization of crucial decisions, most notably those concerning war and peace. Therefore, the urgent question today is: how can this relationship be repaired?
Looking back, the Lebanese state emerged weakened from the civil war that began in 1975 and lasted until 1990. Hezbollah, exploiting the state’s weakness and inability to defend Lebanon, rose to power and, over time, succeeded in gaining the support of a significant portion of the Shia population by capitalizing on their fears and controlling key aspects of their lives. It exploited these fears, working to weaken the state while simultaneously strengthening its own influence and dominating its institutions. This was done in parallel with building its own network of institutions, which it used to connect the interests of a broad segment of the Shia community. Hezbollah also established its own educational institutions and a parallel economy, creating a class of privileged businessmen who amassed wealth and established numerous projects.
Thus, it has become difficult for Shiite citizens to seek recourse from the state, even if they wish to. The state, in their view, is comprised of municipalities, police stations, educational institutions, and government jobs, all of which have been seized by the two main political blocs, particularly Hezbollah. Hezbollah members have become the dominant force on the ground and enjoy immunity from the state, given the exceptions granted to them under the pretext of “resistance.”
Today, there is a need to change the reality and dismantle the wall that has been erected between the Shia community and the state. The task of all those concerned with public affairs requires moving from diagnosis to practical steps to achieve this. While the issue of restricting weapons to the state is fundamental to reforming its relationship with its citizens, the solution can also begin with other steps, particularly the state’s parallel efforts to reform its institutions, assert its authority, and eliminate the privileges that have made partisan elements the de facto rulers on the ground.
In an interview with Daraj, Carnegie Institute researcher Muhannad al-Hajj Ali confirms that there is an opportunity to repair this relationship at this “pivotal stage,” but he points out that the opportunity requires the development of a “peace-level strategy,” as he believes that the state is playing the role of war in peacetime by implementing the paper it approved with an American proposal to prevent the recurrence of war.
Hajj Ali points to two opposing paths now: “Hezbollah’s path, which is mobilizing the Shiites to clash with the state… and the path of the Lebanese state towards achieving independence internally,” a path which he believes also has “obstacles unrelated to the party, which makes the scene complicated,” and he notes that “Hezbollah’s path of mobilization is faster than the state’s path.”
For Haj Ali, the state should “demonstrate a civil presence in southern Lebanon, and interest within a national strategy, and present an approach that aligns with what Prime Minister Nawaf Salam announced in the ministerial statement regarding reconstruction.” He calls on the state to “show its concern for what is happening in the south, and place it among its priorities to strengthen the resilience of the residents there, and prevent Israel from establishing a buffer zone.” He believes that “this government does not have a development approach that takes into account the marginalized areas, which is an essential approach to gaining the trust of citizens.”
Hajj emphasizes the need to develop national educational curricula and impose them on the series of educational institutions owned by the party “to liberate the collective Shiite mind,” especially since “Hezbollah is today the largest publisher on Lebanese soil and produces many books, which necessitates imposing controls.”
In addition, most Shiites live in their areas under the security and visual hegemony of the party, which in turn works to try to consolidate their allegiance to something other than the state, which requires working to lift this hegemony.
Journalist Nour Hoteit begins her vision for solutions from the historical dimension of the relationship between the Shiites and the state. She tells Daraj that the Shiites historically considered themselves marginalized, and saw that the state did not provide them with any kind of services, and that the other sects were dominant. “Therefore, when Sayyid Musa al-Sadr arrived in Lebanon, they carried the discourse of Shiite oppression, and dedicated it in order to be able to obtain their rights in some way, and later they sought to do so through external agendas through Iran after the success of the Iranian Revolution.”
Hoteit believes that this issue “was reinforced by Hezbollah’s discourse, which revolved around the idea of victimhood,” and points out that the party continued to use this victimhood discourse “despite the privileges they enjoyed even before the assassination of former Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. This discourse was politicized in the minds of Hezbollah’s Shiites and used to the benefit of the party’s control.”
Here, Hoteit speaks of “the idea of powerful victims that applied to Hezbollah, meaning that it acts, while in control, as the victim within Lebanon. It has worked for 40 years to promote this mentality and raise generations on it.”
Hoteit draws attention to what she calls the “shadow economy,” or what others call the “parallel economy,” which contributed to Hezbollah’s dominance. She points out that the parallel institutions built by the party—service, health, media, and educational institutions—led to the emergence of a “state within a state.” She believes that reforming the relationship between the Shia community and the state depends on the state’s ability “to integrate those who benefited from these services, to provide an alternative to the shadow economy, and to dismantle this economy and extend its authority in terms of services and education, providing what the party used to provide to the impoverished Shia class, who will not relinquish their loyalty except for a viable alternative.”
Hoteit believes that “even the new rich who became wealthy after the July 2006 war will not give up their privileges.” But despite the network of interests established by the party, which has not yet collapsed, Hoteit believes that the ideological loyalty of these people will decline after the assassination of Nasrallah, “because no one from the base listens to the speech of the current Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, as they used to listen to the speeches of Nasrallah, and this is an indication of the decline in loyalty.”
With the parliamentary elections approaching, which are usually held under the influence of the duo, researcher Muhannad Al-Hajj Ali believes that the margin of freedom will remain limited by the Lebanese reality, but he believes that it can be expanded by restricting weapons to the state, strengthening the presence of security forces and the rule of law and its sovereignty in the areas controlled by Hezbollah, and holding accountable those who attack people.
Perhaps all these proposals need to work on what he called “rebuilding the state,” a process that necessarily involves securing the independence of the judiciary, restructuring the security services, activating accountability for security personnel who are lenient or even colluding with party members, tightening penalties for those who violate the law, and urging them to carry out their duties and take citizens’ complaints seriously.
Hajj Ali believes that implementing these proposals is necessary so that Shiites do not remain vulnerable to intimidation and blackmail, and so that the margin of freedom in political action expands in the areas dominated by the Shiite duo.
Furthermore, lifting the immunity granted to Hezbollah members and subjecting them to accountability and investigation like any other citizen would strengthen the authority of the state and weaken the power of de facto authorities. The privileges granted to them have led to the subjugation of citizens to their influence and have also created a polarizing factor in favor of the party and the movement, as people seek security, privileges, and immunity, thus marginalizing the authority of the state. Therefore, reforming the security apparatus would restore the state’s ability to extend its sovereignty in areas dominated by the two parties and enable it to operate within them without needing permission, coordination, or submission to the conditions of the parties.
When the state is able to impose authority and security and hold accountable those who attack southerners affiliated with the dominant powers, this will open the way for freedom of candidacy and political activity, which will produce healthy practices and reduce incidents of repression and attacks carried out under the cover of parties, at which point people will rush towards the embrace of the state.
These are steps, some simple and many complex, but they remain the mandatory and necessary entry point for protecting the homeland and its most affected sects from the situation we have reached, as a result of surrendering to the “forces of the status quo” under the pretext of “realism.”